Affected Systems

Google Chrome Password Manager on Windows systems with TPM. All three attack paths require malware already running as an ordinary user. Specific affected Chrome versions not disclosed. Attack paths target device keys, re-enrollment logic, and the Security Domain Secret (SDS) protecting synced passkeys.

Exploitation Status

No evidence of active exploitation in the wild. Unit 42 research disclosure only. No CVE identifiers assigned. Proof-of-concept demonstrated against eBay (now fixed) and GitHub (already resistant). Remediation status unclear; Google has removed SDS from FIDO logs but full mitigation unconfirmed as of August 3, 2026.

Business Impact

Post-compromise attack enabling silent account takeover of passkey-protected services without user interaction or biometric verification. Golden Pass-ta-key and Silver Pass-ta-key provide persistent access from attacker infrastructure after initial endpoint compromise. Risk limited to environments where endpoint malware is already present. Relying parties that enforce userVerification=required and validate UV flag are partially protected against Pass-ta-key. No user-facing controls exist to detect SDS exposure or rotate compromised secrets.

Urgency

🟡 Within a week

Recommended Actions

  • Audit Chrome deployment on Windows endpoints; ensure endpoint detection and response (EDR) monitors %LocalAppData%\Google\Chrome\User Data for unauthorized access by non-Chrome processes.
  • For high-value accounts, prefer hardware security keys (FIDO2 tokens) over Chrome Password Manager passkeys until Google confirms full remediation of all three attack paths.
  • If operating a web service accepting passkeys, enforce userVerification=required in WebAuthn policy and validate the UV flag in authentication assertions server-side.
  • Monitor Google Chrome release notes and Chromium issue 398125799 for patches addressing TPM key persistence, deferred UV key creation, and SDS memory exposure.
  • Consider disabling Chrome sync for Password Manager data in high-security environments until Google publishes an SDS rotation mechanism and confirms attack paths are closed.