Actor Profile

Head Mare is a threat actor conducting targeted intrusion operations against Russian organizations across critical infrastructure and technology sectors. The group demonstrates advanced capabilities in identifying and weaponizing zero-day vulnerabilities in enterprise software, particularly videoconferencing and secure communication platforms. Their motivation appears focused on espionage and persistent access to Russian entities in instrumentation, electronics, transport, energy, IT, and software development sectors. The actor exhibits sophisticated tradecraft including multi-stage exploitation chains, custom malware development, and strategic use of legitimate cloud services for C2 infrastructure.

TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, Procedures)

Head Mare employs a multi-stage attack chain beginning with exploitation of vulnerabilities KLCERT-26-057 and KLCERT-26-058 in TrueConf servers (versions 5.3.x-5.5.x) via TCP port 4307. The group achieves initial code execution in an isolated environment (T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application), then escalates privileges to NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM (T1068: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation). Persistence is established through web shell deployment in "locale.php" (T1505.003: Web Shell) and Windows services installed via Base64-encoded PowerShell commands (T1059.001: PowerShell, T1543.003: Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service). The actor performs credential dumping via lsass.exe memory dumps (T1003.001: LSASS Memory), establishes SSH reverse tunnels (T1572: Protocol Tunneling), and uses Microsoft OneDrive as C2 infrastructure (T1102: Web Service). Supply chain compromise is achieved by replacing legitimate TrueConf client installers with trojanized versions containing PhantomCore (T1195.002: Compromise Software Supply Chain). Additional techniques include DLL side-loading (T1574.002), process injection via NtWriteVirtualMemory/NtCreateThreadEx (T1055), and log deletion for anti-forensics (T1070.001: Clear Windows Event Logs).

Targets & Patterns

Head Mare exclusively targets Russian organizations across multiple critical sectors including instrumentation, electronics, transport, energy, IT, and software development. The targeting pattern suggests strategic interest in critical infrastructure, technology development, and industrial capabilities within Russia. The actor's focus on videoconferencing and secure communication platforms (TrueConf, ViPNet) indicates intent to compromise communication channels and gain broad access to organizational networks. The July 2026 campaign represents continued targeting of these sectors, with previous activity dating to September 2025. The consistent geographic and sectoral focus demonstrates a deliberate, sustained intelligence collection effort against Russian entities rather than opportunistic targeting.

Historical Context

Head Mare has demonstrated a persistent pattern of exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities in TrueConf software. In April 2026, Positive Technologies disclosed that the group had exploited three separate TrueConf vulnerabilities (BDU:2025-10114, BDU:2025-10115, BDU-2025-10116) since September 2025 to deploy PHP web shells and conduct information theft operations. The July 2026 campaign detected by Kaspersky represents continued exploitation of the same software platform using a new vulnerability chain (KLCERT-26-057, KLCERT-26-058). Additionally, Kaspersky identified a separate APT-style campaign ongoing since May 2026 involving the HelloNet toolset, which hijacked the ViPNet product suite update mechanism to target Russian government, energy, transport, education, and logistics sectors. This parallel campaign demonstrates Head Mare's capability to exploit multiple software supply chains simultaneously. The group's malware arsenal has expanded to include PhantomCore, PhantomGraph, HelloInjector, HelloProxy, HelloExecutor, HelloCleaner, and HelloBackdoor, indicating sustained tool development and operational maturity.

Defensive Recommendations

  • Immediately update TrueConf Server to versions 5.3.9, 5.4.9, or 5.5.5 (released June 18, 2026) to patch KLCERT-26-057 and KLCERT-26-058 vulnerabilities
  • Monitor and restrict access to TrueConf server TCP port 4307; implement network segmentation to limit exposure of videoconferencing infrastructure
  • Detect T1059.001 PowerShell execution via Sysmon Event ID 1 with command-line logging enabled; alert on Base64-encoded PowerShell commands installing services (T1543.003)
  • Monitor for T1003.001 LSASS memory dumping using EDR telemetry and Windows Event ID 10 (process access to lsass.exe); implement LSA Protection and Credential Guard
  • Inspect integrity of software installers and distribution files; implement file integrity monitoring on public-facing web directories for unauthorized modifications (e.g., locale.php web shell)
  • Detect T1102 Web Service C2 by monitoring for unusual Microsoft OneDrive API activity from service accounts and system processes; baseline normal cloud storage access patterns
  • Hunt for T1574.002 DLL side-loading of wtsapi32.dll and suspicious service installations (SysExcSvc.dll, SysReadSvc.dll) using process creation telemetry and service enumeration

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# Geopolitical Context

Geopolitical Context

The Head Mare campaign represents a sustained targeting effort against Russian critical infrastructure and government entities, exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities in domestically-used collaboration software. The actor's repeated exploitation of TrueConf servers—a videoconferencing platform popular in Russia—and ViPNet secure networking products suggests either advanced reconnaissance capabilities or insider knowledge of Russian enterprise IT environments. The targeting pattern across instrumentation, electronics, transport, energy, IT, and software development sectors indicates strategic intelligence collection objectives rather than financially-motivated cybercrime. The campaign's focus on Russian entities, combined with sophisticated tradecraft including multi-stage malware deployment and anti-forensics measures, is consistent with state-sponsored espionage operations. The use of cloud services like Microsoft OneDrive for command-and-control infrastructure reflects an operational security approach designed to blend malicious traffic with legitimate enterprise activity.

State Actor Alignment

Head Mare's targeting profile and operational pattern suggest potential alignment with state interests adversarial to Russia, though no public attribution has been made by authoritative sources. The actor's sustained focus on Russian critical infrastructure sectors—particularly energy, transport, and defense-adjacent industries like instrumentation and electronics—aligns with strategic intelligence priorities typical of nation-state cyber operations. The parallel Check Point disclosure of TrueConf exploitation targeting Southeast Asian government entities (CVE-2026-3502) may indicate either a broader operational mandate or tool-sharing among distinct threat groups. Russian cybersecurity vendors Kaspersky and Positive Technologies have documented the activity since at least September 2025, suggesting the campaign predates the July 2026 detection window. No sanctions designations or formal government attributions have been publicly announced in connection with Head Mare operations as of August 2026.

Business Impacty pro region

The Head Mare campaign underscores persistent vulnerabilities in Russia's critical infrastructure software supply chain, particularly in collaboration and secure networking tools developed for the domestic market. The targeting of TrueConf and ViPNet—products designed to meet Russian data sovereignty and security requirements—highlights the strategic risk posed by zero-day exploitation against localized technology ecosystems. For European and allied intelligence services, the campaign provides insight into adversary capabilities for supply chain compromise and the operational value of targeting videoconferencing infrastructure as an initial access vector. The Southeast Asian government targeting disclosed by Check Point suggests potential spillover effects beyond Russia, raising concerns about the geographic scope of Head Mare operations. The campaign may complicate Russia's efforts to promote domestic software alternatives to Western platforms, as security incidents in flagship products like TrueConf could undermine confidence in indigenous technology solutions. Energy and transport sector targeting carries particular significance given Europe's historical energy interdependencies with Russia and ongoing concerns about critical infrastructure resilience.

Forecast

If Head Mare continues to demonstrate zero-day exploitation capabilities against Russian enterprise software, additional targeting of domestic collaboration and security platforms is likely in the near term. Vendors serving the Russian market may face increased scrutiny and pressure to accelerate vulnerability disclosure and patching cycles. If the actor's operational security remains robust and no definitive attribution emerges, the campaign is likely to persist through 2026 and potentially expand to additional sectors or geographic regions. Should Western intelligence agencies or cybersecurity vendors publish formal attribution linking Head Mare to a specific state actor, diplomatic tensions and potential retaliatory cyber operations could follow. If the TrueConf exploitation techniques become publicly documented in sufficient detail, copycat campaigns by lower-tier threat actors targeting unpatched servers in Russia and neighboring markets may emerge. Organizations in Russia's critical infrastructure sectors that rely on TrueConf or ViPNet products and have not applied June 2026 patches remain at elevated risk of compromise in the coming months.