Affected Systems
Google Kubernetes Config Connector (KCC) running in Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE) clusters. All versions appear affected. Organizations using KCC with organization-level or broad IAM roles (e.g., roles/owner, roles/resourcemanager.organizationAdmin) are at risk.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept publicly disclosed. Exploitation requires only Kubernetes namespace access and permission to create IAMPolicyMember resources. Attack is trivial: a single malicious YAML file. Active exploitation status unknown.
Business Impact
An attacker with limited Kubernetes namespace access can escalate to full Google Cloud organization owner privileges without holding any GCP credentials. This bypasses both Kubernetes RBAC and Google Cloud IAM through a confused deputy attack. The KCC service account acts on behalf of the attacker, granting arbitrary IAM roles. Impact includes full organizational compromise, data exfiltration, resource manipulation, and persistent backdoor creation across all GCP projects.
Urgency
🟠Within 24 hours
Recommended Actions
- Audit all Kubernetes namespaces with KCC enabled and review which users/service accounts have permission to create IAMPolicyMember, IAMPolicy, or IAMServiceAccount resources.
- Apply least-privilege to the KCC Google service account (KCC GSA): scope permissions to specific projects or folders rather than organization-level roles like roles/owner or roles/resourcemanager.organizationAdmin.
- Enable Google Cloud audit logging for IAM policy changes and correlate with Kubernetes audit logs to detect unauthorized IAMPolicyMember resource creation.
- Implement Kubernetes admission controllers (e.g., OPA Gatekeeper, Kyverno) to restrict IAMPolicyMember resources to approved roles, members, and resource scopes.
- Review recent IAM policy changes in Google Cloud Console and Cloud Logging for unexpected bindings created by the KCC service account, especially roles/owner or roles/editor at organization or folder level.